1947, USS DOUGLAS H. FOX HITS A WW II MINE OFF VENICE
THREE FATALITIES, TWELVE INJURED
The Fatalities:
Berthold, Melvin Louis, CM1
Mockford, Robert Lewis, RDM3
Charlton, Charles Ronald, SM3
The Injured:
Dickey, Stanley Lowell, SM2
Ferber, Richard Eugene, S1
Ferrando, Harry, S1
Folsom, Kenneth Austin, S2
Hurt, Oscar Melvin, CK3
Lay, Myron Harry, S1
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Lovely, Raymond F. Jr., MAM3
Moore, Joseph Patrick, S2
Powers, Leonard Mullane, S1
Saalwaechter, Robert E., SSML3
Vincent, Carl Junior, F2
Walsh, Eugene Aloysius, S2
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What Happened:
On Monday morning 29 September the Fox got underway at 0956 with the
Captain on the bridge and Mr. F. Codan, the pilot at the con. Orders had
been received on the prior Saturday at 1900 and conveyed to the Captain
who was at the Excelsior hotel in Lido with the Exec, to depart Venice
(Photo 112) for Trieste by 0930 as
HMS Mauritius was to moor at the Fox's berth at 1030. After discussion
the Captain decided to take the northern (shorter) route and this was
passed to the Assistant Navigator, and the route was laid out by the
CQM Price assisted by QM3c Allen, with the Assistant Navigator checking.
The northern route went through a cleared channel designated NEMEDRI 15/29
and three points given on the back of the NEMEDRI document were to be
used in laying out the course.
For reasons unknown all three of the above did not realize that three
points were given and instead plotted only points 1 and 3 plotted and
then connected by a straight line to show the track to be taken from
Venice to Trieste. Both the Captain and the Exec were advised by the
Assistant Navigator that he had checked the plot personally which
satisfied them that they could proceed. The cleared channel however
was not a straight line but in fact changed at point 2, such that the
correct course for the first leg was 067 while a course of 073 had
been laid out. ( "It was well known that the ship was sailing in
dangerous waters as on September 9, the ship destroyed a mine and a
second mine exploded at a distance of 500 yards and the jolt to the
ship gave all hands a concrete idea of what mines could do. from the
testimony of Ens. A.C.Holland, OOD at the time of the mining). Lookouts
were stationed and cautioned to be extra alert, and running fixes were
taken which showed that the ship was following the chosen course. Both
the Captain and the Exec were on the bridge late in the morning as
objects were spotted which turned out to be floating debris. At 1240
the Captain left the bridge and at 1325 there was a violent explosion
aft as a mine scrapped down the starboard side and was pulled in by
the propellers. Flooding quickly began in all compartments aft of
frame 170.
Extensive damage was suffered (Photo's 109,
110 and
111) resulting in the death of three enlisted men and injuries to
twelve others. In the next several hours through the exceptional behavior
of the crew, the ship was kept afloat and the wounded were treated such
that all in time returned to active duty. In the Captain's report it was
stated, "While all hands did their jobs well several deserve special
mention. Clark, SF1, did an excellent job as leading petty officer in
the damage control section. He seemed to be everywhere working below in
the after part of the ship until it was in drydock in Venice. Green,
CPHM, directed the handling and treatment of the injured and the rendering
of first aid in an excellent manner such that all twelve wounded avoided
permanent injury. Steltzer, COX, showed great initiative and ability in
helping direct the search for injured personnel, and then assisted Clark
in combating the damage". Lay, S1, was badly shaken by the explosion but
manned his station as talker amidships until sent to the dressing station
by Supply Officer Anderson. Holtzlaw, TM1, had the situation under
control in C-204. At 1545 the Commander Destroyer Two aboard the
USS Owens arrived and the wounded were transferred and taken to
the Army hospital in Trieste. The Fox was taken in tow by a tug
and returned to Venice where temporary repairs were made in drydock.
Subsequently the Fox was towed across the Atlantic to Boston Navy
Yard where a new stern section was put in place.
On October 2, 1947 a court of Inquiry was convened aboard the Fox and
then continued on USS Yellowstone in Venice until October 16. Upon
completion of the hearings the court issued a Finding of Facts, an
Opinion, and Recommendations (see copy attached). In its Finding it
states that the "ship struck a mine as a result of being outside the
proper NEMEDRI track". That the ship demonstrated a high state of
training in damage control and handling of personnel casualties.
That the crew was well disciplined and that no indications of hysteria
were observed.
In its Opinion the court said that (1) the Captain had failed to
ascertain that the Exec and the Assistant Navigator fully understood
their responsibilities for the safe conduct of the ship, by reason of
which inefficiency the ship struck a mine. (2) That the Executive
Officer had failed to ensure that he had been relieved of his
responsibility (as Navigator) and did then and there, neglect and
fail to see that the duties of navigator were properly discharged.
(3) That the Executive Officer while also serving as navigator had
failed to exercise proper care in navigating the ship through the
mined area, and neglected to lay a course conforming to the swept
channel. (4) That the Assistant Navigator, while performing the
actual navigation of the ship, had failed to use the utmost care
and precaution in checking the track that been previously plotted
to ensure that it conformed to the swept channel."
In its Recommendations the Court said that all three officers should
be brought to trial, the Captain for Culpable inefficiency in the
performance of duty, the Executive Officer through negligence suffered
the vessel to be hazarded, and the Assistant Navigator charged with
Culpable inefficiency in the performance of duty. Accordingly, in
August 1948 they were tried in a General Courts Martial at the U.S.Naval
Training Station, Newport, Rhode Island, wherein the ships Captain was
sentenced to lose 5 numbers in his grade, the Executive Officer was
acquitted, and the Assistant Navigator was sentenced to lose 10 numbers
in his grade. It should be noted that each of these officers continued
to serve in the U.S.Navy for many years thereafter in posts with
increased responsibility.
RECOLLECTIONS OF THOSE WHO WERE ABOARD:
"I was in the reefer room at about 20 past 1:00 in the afternoon, and
I heard something scraping alongside the starboard side of the ship,
and about ten seconds later, I heard the explosion. The thing was that
in the morning, the people would go down to the reefer room and switch
the compressors. I said, 'I'll do that as soon as I finish inventory'.
He says, 'No. Do it right after chow'. So at one o'clock I went down
to the reefer room, and that's when I heard the explosion. If I was
still back in the ram room, I wouldn't be here today." Peter Pacheco
at the 2002 Reunion.
I had just left the after living compartment, having been rousted from
my bunk by the master-at-arm(might have been Stan Dickey SM2, one of
the injured), and had just enough time to walk to the ship's office
when the mine exploded. In the office there were several tense moments
as we waited for another explosion. God was looking after the Fox that
day and there was no second explosion. The mine apparently scraped along
the starboard side of the ship and became entangled in the starboard
screw where it exploded directly under the shipfitters shop. The
shipfitters shop was open to the sea with no evidence of anyone left
in it. The sail locker had one body and the living compartment was
covered with water mixed with the ruminants of lockers and material
from ammunition storage for gun mount no. 3. Don Jones recollections
in 2002.
I was a sonarman 1/c or 2/c at the time. Yes, I was aboard when we
hit the mine. It blew off both screws and destroyed everything in
the after compartment so we had to be towed from the mine field which
nobody wanted to do. We were if, I remember right, 5 miles into the
mine field when we struck the mine. The story is that the exec told
the navagator to lay out the course from Venice to Trieste and he told
the Chief Quartermaster to lay it out. So he and a striker laid it out
and missed a point which put us in the field instead of the channel.
The navigator was my division officer and I've been trying to get in
touch with him forever now, without success. If you have any ideas
how to contact him I'd appreciate them. He was a JG when I saw him
last. He stopped at my house on his way home. I think he was from
Colorado.
Don Krebs SNM1, February, 2000. Don also served aboard the USS Harding,
DD625, off Omaha Beach on D-Day.
Further excerpts and copies from official Navy records are included
on the pages which follow.
A17-24 COPY
Serial: 0131
United States Naval Forces, Mediterranean,
Care of Fleet Post Office,
New York, New York.
October 24, 1947
The proceedings, findings, opinion, and recommendations of the court of
inquiry in the attached case are approved.
The three defendants will remain at their present assignments on board the
U.S.S. Fox. That ship is scheduled to be towed to the U.S. during November,
1947. All other ships in this Force are scheduled to return to U.S. during
November. As it will be impracticable to try the three defendants by general
court-martial within this Command the record of proceedings are forwarded to
Commander Destroyers, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, with the request that the
recommendations of the court be effected by that Command.
The convening authority is of the opinion that Commander Travis should also be
tried for neglect of duty. He received notice at 2100B, 27 September, 1947,
that his ship was ordered to get underway at 0800B, 29 September, 1947, and
proceed from Venice to Trieste. He was well aware that the waters through
which his ship was to sail contained mine fields and that he must exercise
particular care in following the cleared route through these mine fields.
The evidence indicates that he did not look at the Chart until the morning
of 29 September and he did not consult NEMEDRI. In fact he was so
unconcerned about the safety of his ship that he did not even know that
there were three limited points in NEMEDRI route 15/29. It would have
taken him only a few minutes to consult NEMEDRI with the Chart, yet he
in his argument contends that it was necessary to delegate this duty even
though he had thirty-five hours notice when he was only a short distance
from the ship at a local hotel. His neglect and failure to consult NEMEDRI
personally and check the Chart therewith was the primary cause of the
accident.
On pages 52(a) and 53 of the record, Commander Travis testified that Ensign
Larson was the Navigator. His testimony further states that Ensign Larson
was not qualified as officer of the deck underway. The testimony of Commander
Travis does not alter the fact that the official roster of ships officers
showed Lieutenant Commander Oliver as the Navigator. Ensign Larson was never
officially designated as the navigator. Furthermore Ensign Larson was not
qualified to be designated as Navigator as he was not qualified to relieve
the officer of the deck in battle and during quarters as required by U.S.
Navy Regulations.
As Sections 101 and 103 of Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean,
Information Pamphlet were referred to in the testimony, certified copies
are appended hereto.
B. H. Bieri,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean.
COPY
USS DOUGLAS H. FOX DD 779
Copied From the Records of the Court of Inquiry Held in October 1947 Aboard
USS Yellowstone
ARGUMENT OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
I do not consider the observations herein contained an argument in the strict
sense. As a court of inquiry is a fact finding body, the duty of the judge
advocate is to lay the facts before the court, I feel that it is not my
prerogative to give my opinions and my conclusions. Instead, I shall confine
myself to observation of fact as brought out in the testimony and let the
court draw the conclusions there from.
Due to the urgency on completing the testimony, we have worked around the
clock and the last day's proceedings and evidence are not yet transcribed.
However, facts brought out are still fresh enough in my mind that I feel
that I can proceed with my argument.
I do not feel it necessary to elaborate on the concise description of damage
presented in the testimony of Captain Tooke, USN. The testimony itself,
along with the photographs introduced, presents a very clear picture for
the court.
I do not feel qualified to deal with the facts brought out by the doctors
in the medical testimony, other than to point out that the one dead man not
positively identified by the Medical Officer, U.S.S. J. C. OWENS, was
identified in the testimony by James W. McCain, CMOMM, USN.
All testimony points to the fact that the ship's company behaved in a
thoroughly commendable fashion, and did a seaman-like job of controlling
the damage. Flooding and list were quickly brought under control, and no
damage subsequent to that incurred in the actual explosion was suffered
by the ship. Nor were any injuries to personnel incurred subsequent to
the explosion. All personnel not fatally injured at the time of the
explosion are expected to fully recover.
The FOX got underway from Venice for Trieste in accordance with dispatch
orders from ComDesRon Two. The orders prescribed no definite route to be
followed. As ComDesRon Two pointed out at the time and as shown in
"Exhibit 1" the orders were written in the same manner as sailing orders
are written by ComNavMed. The routing is covered in ComNavMed's information
pamphlet dated 1 July 1947, which is for compliance of all ships in the
Mediterranean duty. It states that NEMEDRI shall be followed where applicable.
The Executive Officer, U.S.S. FOX, testified that the above mentioned pamphlet
was aboard prior to the explosion and that he was familiar with Articles 101
and 103.
Evidence from the testimony of the Captain, Executive Officer (Navigator),
Assistant Navigator, and Chief Quartermaster shows that all of the foregoing
persons were aware of the fact that NEMEDRI was to be used. In fact up to
the actual exploding of the mine all believed the ship was on the NEMEDRI
track. Yet, as evidenced by the Court Navigator's chart and testimony, and
verified by the FOX's own chart, bear in mind that the 1230 running fix was
the same on both charts, the ship was not on the NEMEDRI prescribed track,
either at 1230 nor at 1325, the time the mine was struck. Nor was the course
followed the NEMEDRI prescribed course.
Further evidence proves that this was not due to losing track of the ship's
position. The assistant navigator knew his position. The 1230 running fix
agreed with the Court Navigator's and in the testimony of ComDesRon Two, it
is established that the position given by the ship after striking the mine
was very accurate. A track had been laid down which at least the Captain,
Executive Officer, Harbor Pilot, Assistant Navigator and Chief Quartermaster
by their testimony believed was the NEMEDRI prescribed route 15/29, with
tolerances as testimony of the above named persons. According to "Exhibit 3"
and verified by the court navigator's testimony, the ship was never outside
these tolerances. Yet a glance at the chart and reference to the testimony
shows that this track was not only erroneous but fatal.
The error was obviously in the initial plotting of the track. The court must
decide the question: "Upon whom does the responsibility rest for the proper
plotting of this track."
The track was originally and erroneously laid down by the Chief Quartermaster.
This is shown in his own testimony. Yet, there is no article in Navy
Regulations nor in any other directive to my knowledge that places the
responsibility for the safe navigation of the ship on any enlisted personnel.
Article 880 Paragraph 5 of Navy Regulations states: "Unless in company with a
senior, he (the commanding officer) is responsible for the course steered, and
he is always responsible for the safe conduct of the ship." It appears from
the testimony of the Executive Officer as well as the Captain's own testimony
that the Commanding Officer discharged his duties as to safe navigation short
of personally making a physical check of the plotting of the NEMEDRI prescribed
points. He ordered correct route to be followed, giving this order to the
Executive Officer who is also the officially named Navigator. He checked
visually to see that the route had been laid down on chart No. 3955. He
checked the course with parallel rulers, he saw to it that the degaussing
coils were energized, and that the S.G. Radar was in operation. He discussed
the proposed route with the Harbor Pilot, who in his testimony stated that he
at the time considered the Commanding Officer a careful seaman. He asked the
Navigator once, and the Assistant Navigator twice if those officers were
absolutely certain that the course laid down was the correct NEMEDRI route.
It is the duty of the court to determine whether or not the Commanding Officer
fully discharged his obligations as to safe navigation by his acts as appearing
in the evidence.
Question: Is the Commanding Officer required to make a personal physical
check of the plotting of the points on the chart?
The officially designated navigator as shown on NavPers Form 353 is ..... the
Executive Officer. Article 1011 Navy Regulations states as follows: "The
navigating officer shall keep all sailing directions, light and beacon lists
of the ship, corrected to date in accordance with personal observations and
such other reliable information as he may from time to time be supplied with,
or be able to obtain; he shall see that the sources of this information are
charged against the charts in the proper blank spaces in the chart catalogue;
he shall see that all charts are corrected to date before being used. Copies
of all information obtained by him affected navigation shall be forwarded by
the commanding officer to the Hydrographic Office."
However, testimony given by the Commanding Officer and by himself indicates
that the Executive Officer was Navigator in name only, only for the purpose
of supervising and signing the logs. With the full knowledge of the commanding
officer the actual navigation of the ship was left to Ensign ..... the Assistant
Navigator. Much testimony has been given on this point. The Assistant Navigator
had previously been told by the Captain that he was being made assistant
navigator, and would take over all of the practical navigation. I quote
from the Captain's testimony: "I said I would assign him as assistant
navigator and that I wanted him to do all of the actual navigation of the
ship. I further told him that both I and the Executive Officer would check
on his navigation very closely until we were both sure that he was thoroughly
competent and that eventually he would be assigned as navigator." The Captain
and the Executive Officer both testified that shortly after the arrival in
Europe they considered him thoroughly competent and to the effect that he was,
ipso facto, the navigator. The Captain states that he considered the Assistant
Navigator the actual navigator of the ship in accordance with chapter 26 of
Navy Regulations. The record fails to show that any person ever informed the
Assistant Navigator writing that he was Navigator, or orally, other than to
tell him he would be official navigator when qualified. The Captain and
Executive Officer state that they considered him qualified shortly after
the arrival of the ship in Europe. Moreover the Captain refers to a
conversation between himself and the Assistant Navigator during which the
Captain believed that he had notified him that his work had proven satisfactory.
The fact that navigation was not specifically mentioned permits this comment
to be construed as general rather than in regard to navigation specifically.
The Assistant Navugator apparently construed it as general. It is for the
court to decide whether a navigator can be designated as such by means other
than written orders and if so whether the Assistant Navigator was so
designated.
At this point must be considered what responsibility is incumbent on the
assistant navigator. The Assistant Navigator was informed by the commanding
officer that he would perform all of the actual navigation. This has the full
weight of an order. Nowhere in his testimony does the Assistant Navigator
deny being given this order. He was ordered by the Executive Officer to
check the laying down of the NEMEDRI route on the chart, and by his testimony,
did so, but failed to detect the fatal error on the part of the Chief
Quartermaster in originally plotting the chart. No other officer according
to the testimony ever checked the chart for plotting of NEMEDRI points prior
to the exploding of the mine.
In the event that the court finds that the Executive Officer was the true
Navigator of the ship, and ultimately responsible to the Commanding Officer,
it still must be determined to what extent responsibility can be placed on
the assistant navigator, considering he had first been told by the Commanding
Officer to perform all actual navigation, and ordered by the Executive Officer
to check the plotting of the points. However, it is an established fact that
the Executive Officer did not personally check the plotting against NEMEDRI.
In conclusion, I respectfully point out that the cause for the mining of U.S.S.
FOX is apparent from the testimony. She struck a mine because her track was
improperly plotted. The responsibility is not so easily arrived at. I have
listed what I believe to be the salient facts pertinent to the case. They are
as follows:
- All officers concerned were fully cognizant of ComNavMed instructions,
and believed they were following such instruction.
- They entered mined waters because of an initial error in plotting the
track, not from any failure to use every available means to fix the ship's
position as prescribed in Navy Regulations.
- The initial error was made by the Chief Quartermaster, but not detected
by the Assistant Navigator, the officer detailed by the Executive Officer
to check the plotting.
- The Assistant Navigator was the only officer alleged to have checked
the plotting of the track against NEMEDRI prescribed points.
- The Assistant Navigator had been ordered by the Commanding Officer several
weeks previously to perform all actual Navigation, but was never listed
as the official navigator, nor was ever detailed as such in writing or
verbally.
- The ExecutiveOfficer, although officially listed as navigator performed
none of the actual navigation after the ship's arrival in European water.
- The Commanding Officer was fully aware of the above fact and made no
objection.
- The Commanding Officer considered the Assistant Navigator to be navigator
in accordance with Chapter 26, Navy Regulations, but did not so inform him
in so many words.
I respectfully suggest that the court be guided by the following questions in
considering the evidence at hand.
- Do the Commanding Officers obligations in regard to safe navigation
extend to actually making a physical check of the tract as plotted on the
chart?
- May the full responsibilities of Navigating Officer be delegated by
ordering him to do the actual navigation, but not notifying him officially
in writing or otherwise that he is the Navigation Officer?
- To what extent can the Assistant Navigator be held responsible in
plotting a chart?
WILLIAM H. BARGELOH,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Judge Advocate
Note: Words are shown in italics to denote where titles were used in this
copy in place of the Officers names given in the official transcript.
DD779 COPY
Pers-3201-cl
August 12, 1948
From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Via : (1) Chief, Bureau of Ships
(2) Chief of Naval Operations
Subj : Ct. of Inq. - Mining of USS DOUGLAS H. FOX; deaths of Melvin Louis
Berthold, 274 80 98, CMI, USN and Charles Ronald Charlton, 659,66 71, SM3,
USN; deaths and injuries to other U.S. naval personnel; conv. by Comdr.
NavForMed, 30 Sept. 1947.
Encl : (A) Mimeo Rpt. Of damage to USS DOUGLAS H. FOX, and photographs of
temporary repairs. (Doc. #220604).
1. Forwarded, recommendations of the proceedings, findings, opinion, and
recommendations of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case and the actions
of the Convening and Reviewing Authorities thereon, subject to the remarks
of the Convening and Reviewing Authorities and the Judge Advocate General.
2. The U.S.S. Douglas H. Fox was underway from Venice, Italy to Trieste,
on 29 September 1947, when a mine was struck as the result of the FOX being
outside of the proper NEMEDRI route. As a result of the mine explosion
three enlisted men were killed and twelve were injured, and the FOX suffered
extensive hull damage. The NEMEDRI track for the passage from Venice to
Trieste is indicated to have been improperly plotted by a chief quartermaster
and a quartermaster third class, and was not checked by a commissioned officer.
It is noted that Commander Charles W. Travis, U.S. Navy, Lieutenant Commander
Ray E. Oliver, U.S. Navy, and Ensign Melvin G. Larson, U.S. Navy, the
Commanding Officer, assigned Navigator, and acting Navigator, respectively,
of the U.S.S. Fox, have been tried by General courts martial at the U.S.
Naval Training Station, Newport, Rhode Island. Commander Travis was
sentenced to lose 5 numbers in his grade, and Ensign Larson was sentenced to
lose 10 numbers in his grade. Lieutenant Commander Oliver was acquitted.
3. In the opinion of the Chief of Naval Personnel there is matter of interest
contained herein, which, within the purview of Title 34, Section 276, U.S. Code, relates to the records of the following officers:
Commander Charles W. Travis, U.S. Navy, 72601.
Lieutenant Commander Ray E. Oliver, U.S. Navy, 97752.
Ensign Melvin G. Larson, U.S. Navy, 475555.
C. C. Hartman
Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel
