Commander R.M. Pitts After Action Report
Covering The Events of May 17, 1945
On Picket Station Nine Off Okinawa
U.S.S. DOUGLAS H. FOX (DD 779)
From: The Commanding Officer
To: The Commander-In-Chief, U.S.Fleet
Subject: Action Report - On Radar Picket Station Nine Off Okinawa,
May 17, 1945
Part I
Brief Summary: This vessel engaged in action with enemy aircraft while
acting as Radar Picket on Station 9, at dusk on May 17, 1945. The first contact
was a single plane which was shot down by the 5"/38 battery. Almost immediately
after splashing the bogey, a well coordinated attack developed on this ship
by about eleven planes. In the intense action which lasted about 8 minutes,
all ship's guns were firing simultaneously with as many as three or four
enemy aircraft on a side. Five planes were shot down by this vessel, three
by VAN VALKENBURGH, and one by LCS 53. This ship was hit by a suicide plane
and a bomb between mounts I and II. Mount I was demolished and mount II put
out of commission. The bomb explosion demolished several compartments and
started large fires. These fires were out within fifteen minutes of the hit.
Part II
A. PRELIMINARIES:
1. The ships on Radar Picket Station Nine were U.S.S. Douglas H. Fox (Fighter
Director Ship and OTC) and the U.S.S. Van Valkenburgh, and LCS's 53, 65, 66,
and 67 in support.
2. This vessel had arrived on station and relieved U.S.S. Cowell at 0812.
During the day, there was no enemy air activity. This time was well spent
making final checks and adjustments on all equipment. When the action occurred,
the ship was ready in all respects.
B. MISSION:
1. Our mission was to locate and give warning of enemy aircraft approaching
Okinawa and to intercept and destroy as many as possible.
2. Radar Picket Station 9 was a " hot" one. On the previous three nights the
ships on Nine and been kept very busy. Accordingly we were prepared.
C. DISPOSITION AT OUTSET:
LCS's in column, speed 10 knots, courses 150 T and 330 T. D H. Fox and Van
Valkenburgh on a similar line 1000 yards, to the southwest in column open
order, speed 15 knots, distance 1000 yards, D.H.Fox leading.
Part III
A. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION
1. At 1900 a bogey was picked up on SC radar 260 T - 70 miles. The four plane
CAP, under control of this ship was vectored out to intercept. Only one plot
was obtained. The CAP ordered to orbit at 280 T - 10 miles at 5000 feet. Sunset
1912. The Radar Picket Patrol of two planes was given a steer to base at 1915
when it was called in by Force Fighter Director Officer in Eldorado.
2. Van Valkenburgh reported a bogey at 1926 bearing 270 T, 12 miles, low. This
bogey was confirmed immediately by the SG radar and control was put on the
target. Fire was opened at 1928, and the bogey which maneuvered radically was
splashed at 1929. Almost immediately after the splash, bogies were reported
from the SC and SG radars at 300 T 4 and 5 miles, 250 T - 5 miles, and 270 T
- 4 miles. Control was put on the closest target and fire was resumed. Bogies
then appeared on both the SC and SG radars all around. All our guns opened
up and kept firing steadily for the next few minutes, taking as many as three
targets under fire on a side. One plane was brought down off the starboard
bow by the combined fire of our batteries. One was splashed close aboard
alongside the starboard quarter. At 1934 Douglas H. Fox was hit between
5"/38 mounts II and I by a plane which came in from the port quarter. His
complete tail assembly as shot off before he crashed. Both mounts I and II
were put out of commission and a large fire was started. However 5"/38 mount
III continued to fire in local and together with the machine guns brought
down one more plane which crashed close aboard on the port side of the fantail,
broke a life line, and spread gasoline over the fantail. The shooting stopped
for a few minutes although there were still bogies in the area.
3. Fires were quickly brought under control, and all except the smoldering
fires below decks were out by 1945. Van Valkenburgh again opened fire on a
bogey at 1947 and drove him off.
4. At 2030 Van Valkenburgh came along side and transferred medical assistance.
A new bogey was picked up at 2040 bearing 080 T - 12 miles closing. He
approached at a speed of 100 knots on course 260 T. Both ships got underway.
Van Valkenburgh cleared our side and commenced firing at 2045 with the bogey
bearing 085 T - 3 miles. The bogey turned away, opened the range and was lost
at 12 miles.
5. U.S.S. Converse arrived on station to assist at 2100. She transferred
medical assistance on board, and Van Valkenburgh personnel were returned to
their ship. At 2134 W.D.Porter arrived on station and relieved Douglas H.
Fox as Radar Picket Number Nine. Course was set for Kerama Retto in company
with Converse.
Part IV
A. PERFORMANCE OF OUR ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT.
1. All equipment performed superbly. There were no stoppages or breakage's
until 5"/38 mounts were hit and put out of commission.
2. Ammunition was expended as follows :5"/38, Mk. 18 120 rounds, 5"/38, Mk.
53-2 310 rounds, 5"/38, Mk 53-3 240 rounds, 40mm 1360 rounds, 20mm 2400
rounds,.50 Cal. 3,100 rounds
3. to 7. Not copied for this summary.
B. PERFORMANCE OF ENEMY ORDNANCE
1. A bomb was released just before the plane hit. It penetrated the overhead
and backside of 5"/38 mount II and exploded on impact with the main deck.
Evidence was found of at least two mortar shells of about 3" diameter which
also exploded.
2. The damage caused by the explosion is completely covered in enclosure (C)
the Battle Damage Report.
Part V
A. BATTLE DAMAGE TO THIS SHIP.
1. Complete Damage Report appended separately
2. Damage Control
(a) When the plane hit and the bomb exploded, fires broke out in the
passageway around number two upper handling room, in forward officer's
country. in CPO country, in anchor windless room, and on gun mount number
I. Forward Repair Officer and half of repair party were killed or wounded.
Parts of Repair II and III were sent forward immediately. They found the
fire main ruptured, secured them from the mess hall forward and led out
hoses from fireplugs on the main deck. The emergency fire main was also
punctured above and below the main deck. (Sections (b) and (c) not
copied for this summary).
(d) All Damage control personnel functioned smoothly, they knew what had
to be done and did their work quickly and efficiently. The results of
much intensive training bore fruit.
B. BATTLE DAMAGE TO ENEMY UNITS.
1. Nine enemy planes are known to have been shot down, five by Douglas H.
Fox, three by Van Valkenburgh, and one by LCS 52. Identification is
uncertain, but at least three were Vals.
Part VI
A. TACTICS
1. ENEMY TACTICS
The enemy stayed low over the horizon to the west, out of sight of our radar
and CAP until the latter was ordered to base. Darkness was falling rapidly and
although surface targets were clearly visible, aircraft were but small black
dots on the refraction blurred evening sky. With suspicious promptness a bogey
appeared within two minutes after our F.D.O. had reported our Dusk CAP on steer
for base. He was shot down, but not before he had drawn into the attack at least
ten more planes. Douglas H. Fox seemed to be singled as the principal target for
the group, either as the leading ship or the larger DD present. For a minute or
two, every plane maneuvered for position in all quadrants and then, obviously
on signal, a coordinated attack was launched. One and perhaps two planes are
known to have withdrawn and heckled later but these made no attempt at the use
of suicide tactics.
2. OUR TACTICS.
On the appearance of the first bogey both ships increased speed from 15 to 25
knots and turned to port, uncovering starboard batteries. When multiple attacks
developed Douglas H. Fox increased to maximum speed (370 turns, about 35 knots)
and maneuvered radically, attempting to uncover greatest firepower against most
threatening targets. In this respect, the rapid flow of SG radar information on
JW and JA circuits was invaluable in analyzing the situation and determining the
direction to turn. The plane which crashed aboard came in from the port quarter
and the rudder was hard left at the time of impact trying to swing the ship to
bring more firepower to bear. Van Valkenburgh maneuvered independently throughout
and at no time was more the 1500 yards from Douglas H. Fox. This was an
excellent job considering the violence of the actions and maneuvering. His
orders had been to " Take station to provide close mutual support " and these
were carried out with considerable skill under very difficult circumstances.
At one time, and one time only an order to the helm was given for the purpose
of closing the support craft who were being maneuvered by Commander, LCS Group
12. This order was quickly countermanded for the more important and immediate
considerations of unmasking batteries. Had a lull occurred, Douglas H. Fox
would have maneuvered to close the small boys, but it was not until after
the coordinated attack had passed that this could be considered. Even so,
when the Commanding Officer first asked Combat for a range and bearing to
small boys for the purpose of closing, these were reported as 010 degrees T-
1500 yards. No tactical signals were used at any time; none were considered
either necessary or practicable.
D. COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER OPERATIONS.
One of the big problems in CIC has been to exchange information with Control,
lookouts, machine gunners. (The rest of this section of the report was not
copied for this summary).
Part VII
A. PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE
1. The officers and men of this command performed their duties in action in
complete conformity to the high standards of the Naval Service. Recommendations
for awards are covered by separate correspondence.
B. CASUALTIES.
1. A copy of the report on personnel casualties submitted to the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery is appended as enclosure (D)
Part VIII
The first instinct of a Destroyer Skipper who has been blitzed on Radar Picket
Station is to "speak his piece." He feels as he did when he took his ship out
to relieve, that something is fundamentally wrong with the picture. He looks
down into the smoldering ruins of his new ship, sees the dead lying in mute
rows along the passageways, and wonders if perhaps he has failed either the
ship or the dead in anyway. In the boneyard he talks with officers who have
endured the ordeal before, and the cry that arises, confused but clear above
all else is, "Something is Wrong."
It must be understood that I write a section of recommendations or suggestions
with the studied restraint, confining my remarks to the immediate field of a
Destroyer Captain, and accepting meanwhile the premise that fundamental concepts
of this operations, fabricated by higher authority, are completely sound.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Not less than four (4) and preferably six (6) destroyers assigned to a Radar
Picket Station, steam at 15 knots in a tight circular screen with 1000 yards
between ships. When bogies appear, increase speed to 30 knots and turn
simultaneously to chase tails in a "Luffburycircle." All machine gun batteries
inboard in the circle cover the danger cone of high approach. Main and outboard
machine gun batteries engage low position angle targets in general. Stay in
tight circle unless a plane is very close in and under fire, in which case
individual ship pulls out just long enough for attack to pass then use reserve
speed up to full power to pull back into the circle. If a ship is hit, the next
astern slides outboard so as to place damaged ship in the center of the remaining
circle.
2. Keep boiler power available for maximum speed during all alert periods. If a
single plane can be brought in broadside to, pilots are usually dead before they
can make last minute deflection corrections and the plane can be made to miss
astern. Especially in latter part of a single attack use best acceleration to
pull plane aft. I saw two Miss USS Harry F. Bauer on Radar Picket Station 5 who
had obviously died with too little lead. In multiple coordinated attacks there
is no harm in using all the speed you have, but the concrete advantages were
problematical. The engineers down below certainly feel better about the whole
deal if they are pouring on the coal.
3. I add my voice to a hundred others who ask for the removal of the after
torpedo mount and installation of a 40mm quad and a director for the 5"/38 #3.
I would like to turn in the forward torpedo mount and its intricate director
system which clutters up vitally needed bridge space. When the Navy needed
torpedo batteries we didn't have them. Now the need is for anti-aircraft and
we have torpedoes. And so I suggest the following after removal of torpedoes
(Captain Pitts letter then lists eight more armament changes he would like
to see).
4. Suggests changes to ammunition, and the letter goes on through paragraph
17 with many other suggestions and closes with the following statement.
Destroyers have been called upon for every type of duty known to military
science. We are now confronted with the "Special Attack Corps" and there is
some justification in the belief that we are not fully prepared. "Something
is Wrong." Destroyer men are capable of correcting these deficiencies and
emerging victorious, but we need all the help we can get. We must be heard.
Commander R.M. Pitts, USN.
